Cases, Regulations and Statutes by Achenbach, Robert P., Jr.
Volume 4 | Number 24 Article 2
12-10-1993
Cases, Regulations and Statutes
Robert P. Achenbach Jr.
Agricultural Law Press, robert@agrilawpress.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Peer Reviewed Articles is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achenbach, Robert P. Jr. (1993) "Cases, Regulations and Statutes," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 4 : No. 24 , Article 2.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol4/iss24/2
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                           190
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
8 Est. of Pillsbury v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-425.
9 Est. of Feuchter v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-97.
10 Robinson v. U.S., 90-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 60,045 (S.D. Ga.
1990).
11 See Ltr. Rul. 9336002, May 28, 1993.
12 See, e.g., Est. of Andrews v. Comm’r, 79 T.C. 938
(1982) (discount allowed for minority stock interest
for lack of control and marketability even though
rest of stock owned by siblings of decedent); Est. of
Lenheim v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1990-403
(discount allowed at death for minority interest
status and lack of marketability).  But see Est. of
O'Connell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1978-191, aff'd,
640 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1981) (ranch stock valued at
net asset value of underlying property; court did not
allow discount for mon-marketabiltity).
13 Est. of Lenheim v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1990-403
(discount of 20 percent); Est. of Murphy v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1990-472 (20 percent
discount allowed for non-marketability and state
law restricting liquidation).  See also Est. of Berg v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1991-279, aff'd on these
issues, 92-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 60,117 (8th Cir. 1992)
(estate entitled to 20 percent minority discount and
10 percent for lack of marketability for 26.9 percent
ownership in closely held corporation).
14 Rev. Rul. 93-12, I.R.B. 1993-7, revoking Rev. Rul.
81-253, 1981-2 C.B. 187 (no minority discount for
gift tax purposes for value of one-third interest in
closely held corporations transferred to each of
three children).
15 Est. of Salsbury v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1975-333
(38.1 percent control premium for 51.8 percent of
stock).  But see Est. of Bright v. Comm’r, 658 F.2d
999 (5th Cir. 1981) (no control premium where
decedent's undivided one-half community property
interest in control block of stock was effectively
severed into two minority interests at death; family
attribution rules not applicable).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
HORSES-ALM § 1.01[1].* The plaintiff was injured
while riding a horse owned by the defendants on land
owned by the defendants. The plaintiff was thrown from the
horse when the horse suddenly bolted. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants failed to warn about the horse’s
dangerous propensities. The court upheld a directed verdict
for the defendant because the plaintiff failed to provide any
evidence of the horse’s propensity to throw its rider. Mason
v. Komlo, 621 N.E.2d 716 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL
ESTATE PROPERTY-ALM § 13.03[3].*  Within 180
days after the debtor filed bankruptcy, the debtor's aunt died
leaving the debtor a bequest of real and personal property.
The estate was not admitted to probate until after 180 days
following the bankruptcy petition and the debtor argued that
under state law, the debtor was not entitled to the bequests
until after the will was admitted to probate.  The court held
that the bequests were estate property because under state
law the title to the property passed under the will upon the
death of the decedent, with confirmation upon admission of
the will to probate.  In re Chenoweth, 3 F.3d 1111 (7th
Cir. 1993), aff’g, 143 B.R. 527 (S.D. Ill. 1992), aff'g, 132
B.R. 161 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3].*
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The debtors claimed a
homestead exemption for a 1.1 acre homestead. A creditor
had obtained a judgment lien against the property and 106
acres of farmland and the debtor sought to avoid the lien as
impairing the homestead exemption and as unsecured as to
the farmland. The court held that although Ohio law
allowed attachment of judgment liens against homesteads
only upon sale or execution, the lien could be avoided as
impairing the bankruptcy exemption, even where the
homestead was not going to be sold. The court also held
that although the lien was completely unsecured as to the
farmland, the lien would be allowed to remain in effect until
the land was sold in foreclosure, in case any equity arose
from the sale. In re Mershman, 158 B.R. 698 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1993).
In 1988 through 1990, the debtors lived in a residence
for which the debtors purchased building materials for
improvements to the home. The debtors had not paid for the
materials and the supplier filed a claim in the debtors’
January 1993 bankruptcy case. In October 1990, the debtors
changed residences and claimed a homestead exemption for
the second residence in the bankruptcy case. The supplier
obtained a judgment for the unpaid materials and filed a lien
against the debtors’ homestead. The debtors sought
avoidance of the lien as impairing their homestead
exemption. The court held that because the claim arose
prior to the debtors’ acquisition of the exempt homestead,
the claim could not be avoided; however, because the claim
was against the husband only, the claim could be avoided.
In re Streeper, 158 B.R. 783 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1993).
HOMESTEAD. The court held that the debtors could
claim a homestead exemption under Mo. Rev. Stat. §
513.475, for a residence purchased by the debtors under a
contract for deed. In re Galvin, 158 B.R. 806 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1993).
The court held that the debtor could claim a homestead
exemption for a mobile home under Fla. Stat. § 222.05. In
re Meola, 158 B.R. 881 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
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IRA. The debtor had opened an IRA using personal
funds and had contributed additional personal funds to the
account. The debtor had also rolled over to the IRA
amounts distributed from pension funds after termination of
prior employment. The debtor withdrew the personal funds
from the IRA and turned the funds over to the trustee but
the debtor claimed the remaining funds in the IRA as
exempt under N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5205(c)(2). The trustee
argued that the IRA could be exempt only if the IRA was
initially opened using funds rolled over from pension plans.
The court held that the exemption would be allowed to the
extent of the rolled over funds. In re Modansky, 159 B.R.
139 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1993).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
    DISCHARGE. The debtor was a family farm partnership
with two brothers as the partners. The brothers purchased
farmland for the partnership and in the partnership
agreement and several loan documents declared that the
land was not partnership property. However, the partnership
paid all the tax and mortgage payments on the property and
the partnership listed the land on its bankruptcy schedules.
The court held that because the partners always treated the
land as owned by the partnership, the farmland was
partnership property. The court also held that an FmHA lien
against the property was unsecured and voided as to the
partnership by the bankruptcy case; however, the partners’
personal liability on the lien was not affected by the
bankruptcy case. In re Sealey Bros., 158 B.R. 801 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1993).
PLAN. The debtors’ Chapter 12 plan provided for setoff
of a portion of a Federal Land Bank’s claim by transfer to
the bank of the bank’s stock held by the debtors. The plan
also provided for 10 percent interest on deferred plan
payments to the bank. The court held that under the
majority of cases on the issue, the debtor could use a
transfer of the stock to the bank to offset the claim, to the
extent of the par value of the stock. The court also held that
10 percent interest on deferred plan payments was sufficient
because it equaled the prime rate of interest plus a risk
factor. In re Davenport, 158 B.R. 830 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.
1992).
TRUSTEE FEES. The debtors’ Chapter 12 plan
provided for payment of the trustee’s fees except where
direct payments to creditors were made.  The plan also
provided that the debtor would make all disbursements
under the plan except for payments required to be made by
the trustee. The trustee argued that the trustee fee was
required to be paid on all payments under the plan on
impaired claims, even those directly paid by the debtors.
The debtors argued that the plan allowed direct payment of
impaired claims; therefore, no fee was due for these direct
payments. The Bankruptcy Court held that under Section
586, payments on impaired claims are made under the plan
and require payment of the trustee’s fee. The District Court
reversed, holding that where the confirmed plan provided
for direct payments to creditors without payment of
trustee’s fees, no payment of trustee’s fees was required. In
re Wagner, 159 B.R. 268 (D. N.D. 1993), rev’g, 150 B.R.
753 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1993).
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03[3].*
PLAN. The debtors’ plan provided for valuation of the
debtors’ farm at the fair market value as of the date of the
Chapter 13 petition, less the hypothetical costs of a
foreclosure and sale. The court followed the majority of
cases and held that the hypothetical costs of a foreclosure
and sale could not be deducted from the fair market value of
the debtors’ property, for purposes of determining the
secured amount of liens against the property, where the
debtors remained in possession of the property. In re Huff,
159 B.R. 262 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The debtors originally filed for Chapter 7 in
February 1985 and converted the case to Chapter 13 in
March 1987. The IRS filed claims for taxes for 1982, 1983
and 1988. The debtors received a discharge in July 1990
and in 1991 filed the returns for 1985, 1986 and 1987 but
did not pay the taxes. The debtors filed a second Chapter 13
case in December 1992 and the IRS filed claims for the
1985, 1986 and 1987 taxes. The debtors claimed that the
taxes were discharged in the first Chapter 13 case as
prepetition tax liabilities. The court held that the date of the
original Chapter 7 filing was the date to be used to
determine that the tax claims were post-petition and not
discharged in the first bankruptcy case. The court held that
the IRS had the option to file for the taxes in the first case
or wait until after confirmation to assess the taxes against
the debtors; therefore, the claims could be made in the
second case. In re Hudson, 158 B.R. 670 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtors filed for Chapter 7 and
received a discharge. The IRS made post-confirmation
assessments for prepetition tax liabilities for which the
debtors were convicted of willfully evading taxes and
failure to file tax returns. The debtors sought sanctions
against the IRS for violation of the discharge injunction.
The court held that the tax liability was nondischargeable
whether or not the IRS filed a nondischargeability
proceeding prior to the general discharge; therefore, the
post-discharge assessments were allowed. In re Ellsworth,
158 B.R. 856 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
PARTNERSHIP. The court held that a general partner
was liable for federal employment withholding taxes not
paid by the partnership and that the taxes were
nondischargeable in the partner’s bankruptcy case. In re
Norton, 158 B.R. 834 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993).
SETOFF. The debtor filed the income tax returns for
1987 and 1989 after filing for Chapter 7. The returns
claimed refunds for each year. The IRS set off the refunds
against the debtor’s tax liability for 1984. The debtor then
sought and obtained a determination that the 1984 tax
liability was dischargeable. The debtor then objected to the
setoff by the IRS as void for violating the automatic stay
and requested turnover of the refunds because the tax
liability against which the refunds were offset was
dischargeable. The court held that because the setoff would
have been allowed but for the IRS’s failure to obtain relief
from the automatic stay, neither the technical violation of
the automatic stay nor the pre-discharge determination that
the 1984 taxes were dischargeable prevented the setoff of
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the refunds against the 1984 tax liability. In re Gribben,
158 B.R. 920 (S.D. N.Y. 1993).
The debtor filed for bankruptcy on June 6, 1992 and
filed the income tax return for 1991 on June 11, 1992. The
1990 return was filed on June 16, 1992 and the 1989 return
was filed in November 1992. All three returns claimed a
refund. The IRS sought relief from the automatic stay to set
off the refunds against a portion of the debtor’s 1987 tax
liability, arguing that the liability for the refunds arose on
December 31 of each tax year and were prepetition
obligations of the IRS which could be offset against the
prepetition tax liability of the debtor. The court held that the
setoff would be allowed, noting that a contrary holding
would give debtors too much control over IRS setoff rights.
In re Thorvund-Statland, 158 B.R. 837 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1993).
TAX LIENS. The debtor filed for Chapter 11 in
October 1989 and had the case converted to Chapter 7 in
June 1990. The bankruptcy estate included an automobile of
which the Chapter 7 trustee took possession in July 1990
and eventually sold. The IRS filed a secured claim in
February 1990 based on liens filed in 1988 and 1989. The
trustee sought to avoid the tax liens under Section 545(2)
and I.R.C. § 6323(b) as a bona fide purchaser.  The court
held that because the trustee had notice, upon the IRS filing
of the claim, of the IRS lien before obtaining possession of
the vehicle in July 1990, the trustee could not avoid the lien




AGRICULTURAL LABOR. The plaintiffs were
temporary migrant agricultural workers with family
members who applied for agricultural labor jobs which
offered free housing only to the workers and not the family
members. The practice of not offering free housing to
family members was the prevailing practice in the area. The
plaintiffs argued that the offering of free housing only to
workers violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (as amended
in 1988) provision for discrimination on the basis of
familial status in the providing of housing. The defendant
argued that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA) controlled the employer’s duty to provide
housing for foreign and domestic agricultural laborers’
family members only where the practice is prevailing in the
area. The court held that the IRCA controlled because when
the Fair Housing Act was amended in 1988, the act made no
mention of repealing the IRCA requirement. Also, the
IRCA controlled because the act provided rules in a more
specific area than the Fair Housing Act. Farmer v.
Employment Sec. Comm’n of N.C., 4 F.3d 1274 (4th Cir.
1993).
MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS. The FSIS has
issued proposed regulations expanding the types of labeling
authorized for use on meat and poultry products by
domestic and foreign certified establishments. 58 Fed. Reg.
62014 (Nov. 23, 1993).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiff’s son died
from an allergic reaction to a bee sting while performing
landscaping services on the defendant’s property. The
defendant had sprayed a hive of bees with a pesticide
manufactured by another defendant and the plaintiff alleged
that the bee which stung the son did not receive a lethal
dose of the pesticide. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer
for failing to warn of the danger from failing to give a lethal
dose to all the bees. The court held that the action was pre-
empted by FIFRA because in order for the manufacturer to
avoid liability, the manufacturer would have to include
warnings on the label not required by FIFRA. Moody v.
Chevron Chemical Co., 505 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993).
The plaintiff had applied a herbicide manufactured by
the defendant on a soybean crop in a previous year and then
planted corn on the acres in the following year. The
plaintiff’s corn crop was damaged and the plaintiff sued the
manufacturer for failure to warn that the usual 11 month
carryover period would be increased by drought conditions.
The court held that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted by
FIFRA because the claims were all based on the defendant’s
failure to include the warning on the label and did not claim
any defect in the product.  Worm v. American Cyanamid
Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec. on
rem. from, 970 F.2d 1301 (4th Cir. 192).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].*
Article V of the decedent's will contained all of the
charitable bequests, including one bequest in trust to
generally support the ideas of conservatism. The trustees
executed an indenture of trust which required that all trust
distributions be made only to I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
organizations. The court held that the general requirements
of Article V and the trustee’s indenture agreement
demonstrated that the decedent’s intent was to restrict the
trust to distributions only to charitable organizations;
therefore, the trust bequest was eligible for the charitable
deduction. Buder v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,149 (8th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,145 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.* On the morning of the decedent’s
death, the decedent directed a stockbroker to pay $10,000 to
each of 20 nieces and nephews. The stockbroker began the
process of liquidating a portion of the decedent’s account on
that day, but the transfers were not made until two days
later. The decedent’s estate argued that the decedent’s
instructions created a trust; therefore, the gifts were
complete prior to the decedent’s death. The court ruled that
the stockbroker served only as the decedent’s agent and the
gifts were not complete until the money was transferred
from the decedent’s account after death. Est. of Cummins,
T.C. Memo. 1993-518.
The taxpayer was a beneficiary of a marital trust
established at the death of the taxpayer’s spouse. The
taxpayer had the power to appoint the trust property to
either of the taxpayer’s daughters. The taxpayer wanted to
change trustees but because the trust provided no power in
the beneficiary to change trustees, the taxpayer appointed
the trust property to one daughter under an agreement that
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the daughter would immediately transfer the property to
another identical trust with the taxpayer as beneficiary and
cotrustee. The IRS ruled that the exercise of the power of
appointment and retransfer to another trust would not cause
the recognition of gain to the taxpayer nor would the
transfer be subject to gift tax. Ltr. Rul. 9344016, Aug. 5,
1993.
The taxpayer owned rental real estate and transferred
undivided interests totaling 30 percent of the property to the
donor’s children. The donor also created a partnership for
each building which operated the building. The donor
argued that the transfer to each child was of an interest in
the partnerships. The court held that each transfer was of an
interest in real property because the partnerships could not
be created until each child had an asset to contribute to the
partnership and the donor could not alone create a
partnership. The court also allowed a 20 percent minority
interest discount of the valuation of each gift even though
all the owners were members of the same family and
allowed a 10 percent discount for lack of marketability.
LeFrak v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-526.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s will made a bequest to the surviving spouse of
50 percent of the property in the gross estate which did not
qualify for the marital deduction. The will also bequeathed
the residuary estate to the spouse in trust. The estate made
an election to treat the trust as QTIP and to elect the marital
deduction for as much of the trust property as needed to
reduce the estate tax  to zero. The IRS ruled that the
property passing to the trust was eligible for the marital
deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9343008, July 20, 1993.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. The decedent and
predeceased spouse had created a revocable trust. When the
spouse died, the decedent became the sole trustee and
beneficiary of the trust. The decedent’s position as trustee
was subject to the power of three individuals to declare the
decedent incapable of serving as trustee and to choose a
successor trustee. This group could declare the decedent
competent again and the decedent could then elect to serve
as sole trustee. The group did declare the decedent
incompetent and named a successor trustee who served until
the decedent’s death. The IRS ruled that because the
decedent once served as sole trustee and could have
regained the position as trustee, the decedent had a general
power of appointment over the trust property which was
included in the decedent’s estate. Ltr. Rul. 9344004, July
13, 1993.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent bequeathed special use valuation farm property to
a daughter. The daughter cash rented the property to a
brother. The daughter assisted in the farm operation by
doing some hoeing and weeding, preparing lunches and
observing the operations. The daughter also claimed that
she agreed to waive the rent in the years no crop was
produced. The IRS sent the daughter a questionnaire as to
the use of the property and the daughter returned the
questionnaire on January 11, 1988. The IRS made an
assessment of additional taxes for recapture of special use
benefits on June 16, 1991. The court held that the
daughter’s involvement in the farm operation was
insufficient to change the rental relationship from that of a
cash basis. The court did not accept the daughter’s evidence
of the rental waiver agreement. The court also held that the
IRS had received notice of the ineligibility of the land for
special use valuation benefits upon receipt of the
questionnaire; therefore, the IRS had failed to make an
assessment within the three year statute of limitation period
of I.R.C. § 2032A(f).   Stovall v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 9
(1993).
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[3].* The decedent had created an irrevocable
trust for the decedent’s spouse with the decedent and close
friend as cotrustees. The trust provided for payment of all
net income to the spouse and gave the trustees the power to
distribute trust corpus for the spouse’s support, considering
the spouse’s “needs and the other source of financial
assistance.” The court held that a portion of the value of the
trust was includible in the decedent’s gross estate because a
portion of the trust corpus could be used to satisfy the
decedent’s support obligation for the spouse. The value
included in the estate was determined as 10 percent, the
total value of the trust less the value of the income interest
and the value of the financial assistance otherwise available
to the spouse. Sullivan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-531.
VALUATION-ALM § 6.01[6].* On the date of death,
the decedent owned shares in a closely-held corporation
which equaled 20.83 percent of the voting and 20.74
percent of all outstanding shares. The court used the
discounted cash flow method of valuing the shares with
some weight given to the proceeds of the liquidation of the
corporation two years after the decedent’s death and a 35
percent discount for lack of marketability. No minority
discount was allowed because the valuation method used
was based on a minority interest. Est. of Jung, 101 T.C.
No. 28 (1993).
The taxpayer purchased a residence on 1.3 acres of land
in 1945 and purchased adjoining 3.4  acres of  land in 1950
in order to comply with zoning laws requiring at lease 3
acres for residences. The residential parcel was transferred
to a trust with the taxpayer retaining a term interest in the
property and agreeing to transfer the second parcel if the
transfer would not cause the first property to lose its status
as a qualified personal residence trust under Treas. Reg. §
25.2702-5(c). The IRS ruled that adjoining land can be
included in the trust if “reasonably appropriate for
residential purposes,” but refused to rule that the specific




HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayer was
denied deductions for losses from a horse breeding activity
because the taxpayer failed to demonstrate that the activity
was ever intended to make a profit. Osteen v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-519.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.04[1].*  The
shareholders of an S corporation owning investment tax
credit property was not required to recapture investment tax
credit when the S corporation merged with a C corporation
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in a tax-free reorganization under Section 381(a), because
the merger was a mere change in the form of doing business
where the merged corporation carried on the same business
with the same assets.  Giovanini v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,600 (9th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 90-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,542 (D. Or. 1990).
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ABANDONMENT. This ruling covered two scenarios:
(1) the one taxpayer was a one-third general partner with an
income tax basis in the partnership interest of $180x and a
one-third share of the partnership $120x liabilities; (2)
another taxpayer was a one-third limited partner in a
partnership with only nonrecourse liabilities for which the
taxpayer was not personally liable. Both taxpayers
abandoned their partnership interests without receiving any
money or property; however, the first taxpayer was relieved
of the liability for one-third of the partnership liabilities.
The IRS ruled that because the first taxpayer received a
deemed distribution from the release from partnership
liability, the loss recognized from the remaining basis in the
partnership interest was a capital loss. As to the second
taxpayer, the IRS ruled that the loss recognized from the
remaining partnership interest basis was allowed as an
ordinary loss because the taxpayer did not receive any
actual or deemed distribution upon abandonment of the
partnership interest. Rev. Rul. 93-80. I.R.B. 1993-38.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[3].* The
taxpayer was an S corporation wholly-owned by one
shareholder which leased trucks to a C corporation also
wholly-owned by the same shareholder. The taxpayer
performed customer finding, administrative and technical
support services for the lessee corporation and the
shareholder provided personal services as an employee of
the lessee corporation. The lessee corporation hired drivers
for the trucks and the trucks were maintained by third
parties with the cost split between the taxpayer and the
lessee corporation. The IRS ruled that because the drivers
were not provided by the taxpayer, the personal services
provided by the taxpayer or the shareholder were not
extraordinary personal services and the losses from the
leasing activity were subject to the passive activity loss
limitations. Ltr. Rul. 9343010, July 23, 1993.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in November
1993, the weighted average is 7.54 percent with the
permissible range of 6.79 to 8.29 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 93-57, I.R.B. 1993-37, 6.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
STOCKHOLDER’S BASIS. An S corporation
shareholder’s basis in the corporation was reduced by
payments made by the corporation for property transferred
to the shareholder’s son, for the son’s rent-free use of
corporate property, and for unsubstantiated loans made by
the corporation to the shareholder. Sperl v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-515.
TRUSTS. A trust was a shareholder of a corporation
which made the Subchapter S election. The trust provided
that under some circumstances, trust corpus could be
distributed to a person other than the current income
beneficiary; therefore, the trust was not a QSST. The
beneficiaries of the trust signed an agreement providing that
during the life of the current income beneficiary, no trust
corpus would be distributed to anyone else, and the
beneficiaries obtained a court order making the reformation
of the trust retroactive to before the date of the Subchapter S
election. The IRS ruled that the retroactive application of
the reformation of the trust was not effective for federal
income tax purposes and that the Subchapter S election was
invalid. The corporation was allowed to make a new
election immediately and was not required to wait 5 years to
make the new election under I.R.C. § 1362(g). Rev. Rul.
93-79, I.R.B. 1993-36, 5.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
December 1993
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 3.83 3.79 3.77 3.76
110% AFR 4.21 4.17 4.15 4.13
120% AFR 4.60 4.55 4.52 4.51
Mid-term
AFR 5.07 5.01 4.98 4.96
110% AFR 5.59 5.51 5.47 5.45
120% AFR 6.10 6.01 5.97 5.94
Long-term
AFR 6.06 5.97 5.93 5.90
110% AFR 6.68 6.57 6.52 6.48
120% AFR 7.29 7.16 7.10 7.06
LABOR
AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM § 3.02.* The
plaintiffs were employees of the defendant greenhouse who
worked at various jobs for the defendant. The plaintiffs
were not paid overtime wages for hours worked in excess of
40 hours per week and the plaintiffs filed an action under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for the
extra wages. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs were
agricultural workers exempt from the FLSA requirements.
The court held that an issue of fact remained as to whether
the employees performed nonagricultural labor in the
unloading and storing of “hard goods” such as fertilizers,
soil and planters for resale to customers and the handling of
mature plants purchased by the defendant for resale without
additional horticultural care by the defendant. The court
held that if the employees were found to have performed
such tasks, overtime wages would have to be paid for those
tasks. Adkins v. Mid-American Growers, Inc., 831 F.
Supp. 642 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
PROPERTY
E A S E M E N T . After many years of allowing the
plaintiff to use a road through the defendant’s property in
order to reach the plaintiff’s property, the defendant
installed locked gates on the road. The plaintiff sought an
injunction and a determination of an easement by
prescription in response to the defendant's counterclaim for
quieting title to the road. The court held that summary
judgment for the defendant was improper because a fact
issue remained whether the plaintiff’s predecessors in title
used the road by the permission of the defendant’s
predecessors in title. If the initial use of the road was by
permission, no prescriptive easement could accrue.
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Mefford v. Sinclair, 859 P.2d 1127 (Okla. Ct. App.
1993).
